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Abstract
In light of the fact that the considerable diplomatic efforts that have been made toward the
promulgation of an international code of conduct on the transfer of technology that might soon
be crowned with success, this Article examines the so called “technology development debate.”
It considers some of the reasons for the determination of developing countries to obtain a com-
mitment from the industrialized countires to adhere to a code of conduct. The Article attempts to
evaluate the likley success that the unfettered access of developing countries to advanced technolo-
gies will have in promoting economic development. It also identifies some unintended negative
consequences that this access might produce. Finally, the Article examines a number of alternative
strategems for the technological transformation of developing countries.
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INTRODUCTION
Following intergovernmental negotiations spanning
nearly twenty years, the United Nations may well be on the
verge of adopting an international code of conduct on the
transfer of technology' ("TOT Code"). In July 1964, a resolu-
tion of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") to examine
"the adequacy of existing national and international practices
for the transfer of patented and unpatented technology to de-
veloping countries." 2 Pursuant to this request, the UNCTAD
Secretariat commissioned a number of studies on industrial
property rights and on the terms on which technology was be-
ing transferred to developing countries,3 and in 1970, it estab-
lished an Intergovernmental Group on the Transfer of Tech-
nology.
At the meeting of UNCTAD III in Santiago, Chile, in
1972, a unanimous resolution of the participants urged "the
developed market countries" to improve the means of access
to technology by the less-developed countries, as well as the
terms and conditions on which this technology could be ob-
tained.4 The resolution also charged the Secretary-General of
UNCTAD to investigate the possibility of a new international
regulation of the transfer of patented and unpatented technol-
ogy to less-developed countries.5 In 1974, the Intergovern-
mental Group received, for its consideration, a draft code of
1. UNCTAD, Negotiations on a Draft International Code of Conduct on the
Transfer of Technology, UNCTAD Doc. TD/CODE TOT/51 (Oct. 21, 1987) [here-
inafter TOT Code].
2. ECOSOC Res. 1013 (XXXVII), 37 U.N. ECOSOCOR (Supp. No. 1) at 7, U.N.
Doc. E/3970 (1964).
3. For a comprehensive list of these studies see UNCTAD, Bibliography of Doc-
uments on Transfer and Development of Technology, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/
C.6/INF.2/Rev.5 (1986).
4. UNCTAD Res. 39(iII), 3(1) UNCTAD Proceedings at 108, UNCTAD Doc.
TD/108 (1972), reprinted in Patel, Transfer of Technology and the Third UNCTAD, 7 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 226, 233 (1973).
5. Id. at 110, reprinted in Patel, supra note 4, at 235-37.
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conduct for the international transfer of technology prepared
by a group of experts under the auspices of the Pugwash Con-
ference on Science and World Affairs. 6 A resolution of the In-
tergovernmental Group on the Transfer of Technology in July
1974 requested the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to convene
a group of experts to investigate the feasibility of a universally
applicable code of conduct on the transfer of technology.7 An
.Intergovernmental Group of Experts, which convened the fol-
lowing year, affirmed the feasibility of such a code." At the
1975 meetings of this Intergovernmental Group of Experts,
proposals for a draft code were presented by Mexico on behalf
of the Group of 77 (developing countries) and by the Group B
(Western industrialized) countries.'
The Group of 77 proposal contained a detailed catalogue
of prohibited conduct applicable to all contracts for the trans-
fer of technology, including intra-enterprise transfers and joint
venture agreements.' 0 The code was expressly intended to be
mandatory and contained chapters on preferential treatment
for developing countries and on guarantees to be provided by
technology suppliers. The Group B proposal was animated by
the principle that technology-transfer agreements should con-
tain mutually acceptable obligations. It was expressed to be
non-binding and was to apply to a much more limited cata-
logue of practices and transactions. Subsequently, the Soviet
Union, on behalf of the Group D (socialist) countries, en-
dorsed much of the proposal of the Group of 77, with the ca-
veat that the code ought not apply to government transac-
tions.''
The Intergovernmental Group of Experts was directed by
a resolution of the UNCTAD IV Conference, held at Nairobi in
May 1976, toconclude the preparatory work on the TOT Code
by mid-1977.12 The Group of Experts prepared a Draft Code
that presented the different positions of each group of coun-
6. Reprinted in UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/AC.I I/L.12 (1974).
7. See UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/520 (1974).
8. UNCTAD, The Possibility and Feasibility of an International Code of Con-
duct on Transfer of Technology, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/AC. 11/22 (1975).
9. UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/1 (1975); UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/14 (1975).
10. See sources cited supra note 9.
11. UNCTAD Doc. TD/AC.I/9, Annex 1I (1975).
12. See Roffe, UNCTAD: Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology: A Progress Re-
view, 12J. WORLD TRADE L. 351 (1978).
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tries and was to be presented to a negotiating conference of
the United Nations.13 The Negotiating Conference, which met
in October and November 1978, was unable to overcome the
apparent irreconcilability of the positions of the Group of 77
and Group B countries. Further diplomatic rounds in 1979,
1980, 1983, and 1985 produced agreement on all but the re-
strictive business practice provisions of the TOT Code and the
choice of law and enforcement provisions." '
Resolution 40/184 of the General Assembly of the United
Nations of December 17, 1985 requested the Secretary-
General of UNCTAD and the President of the U.N. Negotiat-
ing Conference to hold consultations with interested govern-
ments on the scope of the issues outstanding on the TOT
Code and on appropriate solutions.1 5 The Secretary-General
of UNCTAD reported on these consultations in October
1986.16 Because of the optimistic tone of this report, resolu-
tion 41/166 of the forty-first session of the General Assembly
requested the Secretary of UNCTAD and the Conference Pres-
ident to finalize these consultations in 1987 with a view to a
final session of the Negotiating Conference in 1988.17
In his most recent report, the Secretary-General of
UNCTAD indicated that agreement on all outstanding issues is
attainable with the application of the appropriate political
will. 18
In light of the fact that the considerable diplomatic efforts
that have been made toward the promulgation of an interna-
tional code of conduct on the transfer of technology might
soon be crowned with success, this Article examines the so-
called "technology development debate." It considers some of
the reasons for the determination of developing countries to
13. Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an International
Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology to the United Nations Conference
on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, UNCTAD Doc.
TD/CODE TOT/i (1978).
14. See UNCTAD, Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Tech-
nology, UNCTAD Doc. TD/CODE TOT/47 (1985).
15. G.A. Res. 40/184, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1985).
16. UNCTAD Doc. TD/CODE TOT/50 (1986).
17. G.A. Res. 41/166,41 U.N. GAOR (Supp. No. 53) at 132, U.N. Doc. A/41/53
(1986).
18. UNCTAD Doc. TD/CODE TOT/51, 25 (1987).
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obtain a commitment from the industrialized countries to ad-
here to a code of conduct. The Article attempts to evaluate the
likely success that the unfettered access of developing coun-
tries to advanced technologies will have in promoting eco-
nomic development. It also identifies some unintended nega-
tive consequences that this access might produce. Finally, the
Article examines a number of alternative strategems for the
technological transformation of developing countries.
I. THE RHETORIC OF DEVELOPMENT
The assumption of almost all the proponents of the trans-
fer of technology is that such transfer is a prerequisite, even an
imperative, for desirable economic and social development.
Solow attributed "87.5% of the growth of per capita income in
the United States" in the first half of this century to "techno-
logical progress, and the remainder to the use of capital."' 9 At
the other end of the developmental spectrum, the deprivation
and poverty suffered by developing countries has been attrib-
uted almost entirely to their technological dependence.20 In
addressing the question of the technological transformation of
developing countries, a 1980 UNCTAD report noted that in-
dustrialized countries spent between six and seventeen times
more of their gross national product on research and develop-
ment than did developing countries. 2' Further, in developing
countries, only one in 10,000 per capita were scientists and en-
gineers, compared with forty-three in market economy coun-
tries and eighty-two in socialist countries.2 2 The report also
noted that developing countries held only 1% of the world to-
tal of patents, and that in those developing countries with pat-
ent systems 84% were owned by foreigners. 2' Finally, the re-
port observed that 90% of the trade in technology took place
among developed nations.2 4
19. Solow, Technological Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON.
& STATISTICS 312, 320 (1957), cited in Ewing, UNCTAD and the Transfer of Technology, 10
J. WORLD TRADE L. 197 (1976).
20. See, e.g., Patel, The Technological Dependence of Developing Countries, 12 J. MOD.
AFRICAN STUD. 1 (1974).
21. UNCTAD, Formulation of a Strategy for the Technological Transformation
of Developing Countries, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/779, 2 (1980).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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UNCTAD also noted that the 75% of the world's popula-
tion in developing countries contributed only 20% of its in-
come, contributed only 17% of world industrial output, and
endured a literacy rate of less than 40%.25 An unstated as-
sumption in this report is that the technological transformation
of developing countries will effect a reversal of these statistics.
This reasoning is also reflected in the preamble to the 1980
Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions,26 drafted
by the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO").
The preamble provides for the adoption of the Model Law by
countries, considering:
(a) the importance of new technology for the economic de-
velopment and in particular the industrialisation of the
country;
(b) the necessity of creating new technology in the country
and of adapting existing technology to needs of the country;
(c) the necessity of obtaining access to foreign technol-
ogy.
2 7
WIPO's 1977 Licensing Guide For Developing Countries com-
mences with the assertion that:
1. Industrialisation is a major objective of developing coun-
tries as a means to the attainment of higher levels of well-
being of the peoples of such countries. The advancement
of science and the development of a technological base are
essential conditions of industrial growth.
2. The development of a technological base in a developing
country depends on the existence of indigenous technologi-
cal capacities and the acquisition of selected technology
from abroad ......
These statements fairly faithfully reflect the philosophy
underlying the Declaration on the Establishment of the New
International Economic Order ("NIEO"), adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations in December 1974.29
25. Id.
26. 1 WIPO, MODEL LAW FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON INVENTIONS 1 (1980).
27. Id. preamble.
28. WIPO, LICENSING GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (1977).
29. This Charter sought to give effect to the Declaration on the Establishment of
a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), 6 Spec. U.N. GAOR
(Supp. No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), and the Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), 6
Spec. U.N. GAOR (Supp. No. 1) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
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II. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
(NIEO)
The demand for the establishment of a New International
Economic Order represents the expression by developing
countries of the policy that is to characterize the third decade
of decolonization. This third decade follows the assertion of
political independence (1960-1970) and of economic indepen-
dence (1970-1980). The years 1980 to 1990 were to have wit-
nessed the emancipation of the developing countries from cul-
tural and technological dependence upon Western industrial-
ized states.
The NIEO comprises three components: first, the elimi-
nation of the economic dependence- of developing countries
on developed-country enterprises; second, the promotion of
accelerated development of the economies of developing
countries on the basis of the principle of self-reliance; and
third, the introduction of appropriate institutional changes for
the global management of the world resources in the interest
of mankind as a whole.3 0
The transfer of technology performs a central role in the
NIEO. The Declaration establishing the NIEO provides that
one of the governing principles on which the new order is to
be established involves "[g]iving to the developing nations ac-
cess to the achievements of modern science and technology,
and promoting the transfer of technology and the creation of
indigenous technology for the benefit of the developing coun-
tries in forms and in accordance with procedures which are
suited to their economies.""1
Interpreting the Declaration, the proponents of the NIEO
assert the right of access of all nations to "the universal heri-
tage" of technology.3 As a corollary, the right of access is to
be secured through the institution of an appropriate legal re-
gime to facilitate technology transfer to developing countries
on "equitable" terms. 3
30. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), supra note 29.
31. Id.; see also Hope, Basic Needs and Technology Transfer Issues in the 'New Interna-
tional Economic Order', 42 AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. 394 (1983).
32. For an excellent critique of the universal heritage thesis see W. FIKENT-
SCHER, THE DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOL-
oGy 25-28 (1980).
33. Id.
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The Programme of Action announced to inaugurate the
NIEO calls for a, regulatory code of conduct responsive to the
needs of developing countries. 34 An early manifestation of this
generally expressed desire for a code of conduct appeared in
the Revised Informal Composite Negotiating Text ("RICNT")
of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea 35 ("UNCLOS
III"). Article 144 of the RICNT provided for measures to
"promote and encourage the transfer to developing countries
of such technology and scientific knowledge so that all states
Parties benefit therefrom."13 6 In the more conventional com-
mercial setting, the access of nations to the "universal techno-
logical heritage" is to be secured through the Code of Conduct
on the Transfer of Technology, 37 to which all members of the
United Nations will subscribe. Additionally, the right of devel-
oping nations to technology is to be recognized in a revision of
the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty. 8
Both of these legislative initiatives have run into the inevi-
table difficulty that the industrialized nations do not share the
conviction of the developing nations that the expensive tech-
nologies developed by the former should be relinquished as if
wrongfully acquired at the expense of the formerly colonized
nations. 39 However, the New International Economic Order is
predicated upon equity in the ordering of technology transac-
tions rather than on the expropriation of technology. 40 To this
end, the various United Nations and transnational agencies es-
pousing the NIEO philosophy do little more than to insist
upon those same principles of opposition to unfair trading
34. See Fairley & Rowcliffe, The UNCTAD Code of Conduct for the International Trans-
fer of Technology: Problems and Prospects, 18 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 218, 231 (1980).
35. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1 (1979).
36. Id.
37. See Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology,
UNCTAD Doc. TD/CODE TOT/47 (1985).
38. Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20th March,
1883, revised, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1900, 13 U.S.T. 1 (official English trans.),
T.I.A.S. No. 4931; see Kunz-Hallenstein, The Revision of the International System of Patent
Protection in the Interest of Developing Countries, 10 IIC STUD. 649 (1980).
39. The political dimension of this debate is extensively canvassed in P. NANY-
ENYA-TAKIRAMBUDDE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1980).
40. See the authorities referred to in Fikentscher, The Draft International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 4 IIC STUD. 22-25 (1980).
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found in the antitrust statutes of most industrialized nations.4'
Thus, the Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer
of Technology promulgated by UNCTAD contains a fairly
standard catalogue of antitrust prohibitions.42
III. EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
A. Overview
The NIEO holds as an article of faith that the transfer of
technology to developing nations will improve their material
circumstances to levels approaching those of the industrialized
nations. The example of the "miracle ofJapan" is employed as
paradigmatic. This theory proceeds on the assumption that
the transfer of technology facilitates the more productive use
of resources and provides a technological base for the develop-
ment of indigenous technology. 43 However, despite the unde-
niable role played by technology as a catalyst for economic de-
velopment, it is not the sole determinant of that growth.
Moreover, it is questionable whether the use of transfusions of
technology as a means of skipping some of the preliminary
stages in the development process is either possible or pru-
dent.
The technology available to developing countries has
largely been produced for markets in industrialized countries.
This technology reflects not only the effective demands, and
relative prices, but also the physical, economic, and social envi-
ronments of those countries. Consequently, the technology
that is accessible "off the shelf" to developing countries is
likely not to be well suited to their needs. As Hansen explains,
"the realization of the developmental objectives is crucially de-
pendent on whether the mechanism of transfer is rightly
adapted to the absorptive capacity of the economy."44
Additionally, because most technology originates from de-
veloped countries, the institutions and legal arrangements
41. For a comparison of the TOT Code provisions with typical antitrust provi-
sions, see G. CABANELLOS, ANTITRUST AND DIRECT REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS (1984).
42. See TOT Code, supra note 1, ch. 4.
43. See MOBILIZING TECHNOLOGY FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENT U. Ramesh & C.
Weiss eds. 1979).
44. Hansen, Economic Aspects of Technology Transfer to Developing Countries, 11 IIC
STUD. 429, 430 (1980).
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governing technology dissemination have been designed pri-
marily to serve the particular interests of developed countries.
Thus, the very notion of industrial property rights is said to
reflect the concern in market economies with the sanctity of
private property.4 5 This sits uncomfortably with the claim of
developing countries to technology as a universal heritage.
Consequently, the demands of developing countries for access
to technology is paralleled by their demands for a restructur-
ing of the legal environment that controls such transfers.
B. Foreign Exchange Cost of Technology
Industrialized market economies dominate international
technology trade, while developing countries' participation in
such trade is limited. For example, of the US$2.193 billion re-
ceived from abroad by United States companies in 1977 in
technology license fees and royalties, only 8.1%, or US$177.6
million, was received from developing countries. 46 Neverthe-
less, these payments represent a significant economic burden
for developing countries, given their limited financial re-
sources. In a 1975 report, UNCTAD estimated the cost to the
balance of payments of developing countries (other than those
of southern Europe) directly connected with the transfer of
technology to be equal to about 5% of their total exports and
8% of their total imports of machinery, equipment, and chemi-
cals. More significantly, these payments represented about
37% of public debt service payments and 56% of the annual
flow of direct private foreign investment.4 7
The annual rate of growth of the direct cost to developing
countries of technology was estimated by UNCTAD to be
about 20%.48 Added to this amount are various indirect costs
associated with such transfers, including consulting and mana-
gerial services, transportation, and financial charges associated
with technology funding.
45. See Helleiner, International Technology Issues: Southern Needs and Northern Re-
sponses, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: [HE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE
295, 296-97 U.N. Bhagwati ed. 1977).
46. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 23 (1978).
47. UNCTAD, Major Issues Arising from the Transfer of Technology to Devel-
oping Countries, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/AC.I 1/1, 98 (1975).
48. Id. 101.
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C. Development and Comparative Advantage
The supposed efficacy of technology transfer in promoting
economic development derives in part from the classic English
economic theory of international trade known as comparative
advantage.49 Crudely expressed, this theory explained the
nineteenth century economic preeminence of Britain as being
attributable to its comparative advantage in capital-to-labor ra-
tios.50 The gradual recognition of the significance of technol-
ogy in economic development did little to discredit the classi-
cal theory; technological hegemony was simply construed as
another factor of comparative advantage enjoyed by the indus-
trial nations."' Whatever the veracity of this theory for nine-
teenth-century Britain, today the comparative advantages of
the industrialized nations is reinforced by the restriction of for-
eign competition through tariffs and quotas imposed upon im-
ports as well as through the maintenance of a manageable pop-
ulation by the restriction of immigration. Thus, it has been ob-
served, "Standards of affluence achieved through labour
scarcity and resulting high wages stand to be lost permanently
through the development of production of technology-based
goods in less developed countries, and this loss is accelerated
by the reduction of trade barriers ....5
Consequently, the diffusion of technology may result not
in the attainment of the high standards of living enjoyed by
industrialized nations, but merely in the removal of compara-
tive advantages. Thus the shift of technological skills to low-
wage developing countries may result largely in lower prices
for developed country consumers rather than higher incomes
for developing country producers.
Where technological growth does occur in developing
countries, it often redounds to the benefit of an elite class,
whose consumption patterns resemble those of the elite in de-
veloped countries.53
49. Johnson, Technological Change and Comparative Advantage: An Advanced Country's
Viewpoint, 9J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 8 (1975).
50. See, e.g.,J. PARKER, THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION ch. 2 (1974).
51. See, e.g., J. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 64 et seq.
(1959).
52. Id. at 8.
53. See Lall, The Patent System and the Transfer of Technology to Less-Developed Coun-
tries, 10J. WORLD TRADE L. 1 (1976).
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To the extent that high wages in the developing countries
reflect the necessary return on the cost of developing technol-
ogy and the training of skilled labor, the NIEO assumes that
the technology exporting companies are prepared to bargain
away these development costs and to absorb the risk of labor
demands from workers whose wage levels are placed at risk by
the trade in technology.54
Another factor ignored in the NIEO philosophy is the ex-
tent to which technology prices will be bargained up by the
competition between developing countries. Technology in-
flow will inevitably be secured by the offer to multinational cor-
porations of tax and import subsidies, guarantees on the repa-
triation of royalties and capital and tariff protection. Paradoxi-
cally, the expense of this investment to developing countries
will encourage in them the same protectionism that the NIEO
seeks to break down in the industrialized countries.55
D. Growth Through Technology
Another of the NIEO's articles of faith is the assumption
that the transfer of technology will enable developing coun-
tries to circumvent the evolutionary process through which the
industrialized nations have progressed.5 6 It is questionable
whether the improvements in factory productivity that
technolgical change can procure serve as an adequate substi-
tute for resource endowment, capital accumulation, and ex-
pansion of an educated labor force. The capacity of a technol-
ogy recipient to participate in international trade is considera-
bly circumscribed because of several circumstances: where it
lacks sufficient diversity in resource endowment to permit al-
teration of production sectors in response to changes in rela-
tive prices; where poor educational standards do not permit
54. See Balogh, Fact and Fancy in International Relations, WORLD DEV., Feb. 1973, at
76, 80.
55. On the trade policies of the NIEO, see the articles collected in THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE (J.N. Bhagwati ed.
1977).
56. See Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Eco-
nomic Order, G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), supra note 25, reprinted in 2 U.N. INST. FOR
TRAINING & RESEARCH DOCUMENT SERV. 1, A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1945-1975, at 893 (A. Moss & H. Winton comps. n.d.).
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the easy transfer of labor from one sector to another; and
where capital is limited to role-specific, fixed investments.
It is also questionable whether any amount of technology
transfer can overcome the comparative advantages currently
enjoyed by the technology-rich countries." Indeed, even the
resource endowments of the industrialized nations have been
unable to overcome the sometimes considerable inequalities
existing among different regions of those countries.
Finally, it is difficult to conceive how the current asymme-
tries of international trade, where multinational corporations
,whose incomes vastly exceed the gross national product of all
the developing nations (excepting China and India)5" can be
reversed merely by improving the terms on which those corpo-
rations transfer their technology. However, seen over the
longer term, the positive effects of technology transfer can be
identified. Industrialization has been occurring in developing
countries, sometimes at spectacular rates. One effect of this
has been that developing countries are enjoying an increasing
share of world trade.59 Additionally, imported technologies
have been the source of a horizontal diffusion of technological
skills; labor skills developed to service a particular technology
import then became available for other industries and for ex-
port.
E. Appropriateness of Technology
Hansen identifies a sequence of three stages of economic
development, each characterized by a different capacity for ab-
sorption of technology.6" At the earliest stage of devleopment
there is little indigenous capacity for research and an almost
57. For example, in the British context, see Cooke, Dependency, Supply Factors and
Uneven Development in Wales and Other Problem Regions, 16 REGIONAL STUD. 211 (1982);
Holland, Capital, Labour and the Regions: Aspects of Economic, Social and Political Inequality
in Regional Theory and Policy, in SPATIAL INEQUALITIES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
185-218 (H. Folmer &J. Oosterhaven eds. 1977).
58. See U.N. ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMM'N ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPS.,
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT: A REEXAMINATION, U.N.
Doc. E/C.10/38, at 254, 259 (1978), U.N. Sales No. E.78.II.A.5.
59. For example, OECD imports from developing countries in the 10 years from
1970 through 1979 increased at an annual average rate of about 22%, while OECD
imports to developing countries were running at 26.3% in 1979. OECD,
NORTH/SOUTH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ADJUSTMENTS AHEAD 54 (1981).
60. Hansen, supra note 44, at 432-39.
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total reliance on foreign technology. In addition to the tech-
nology itself, the supplier must also provide relevant manage-
ment and skilled labor. The appropriate method of transfer at
this stage is usually through turn-key arrangements. This is be-
cause there will be a lack of both expertise in the working of
patents and designs and of the skills necessary for the mainte-
nance and repair of capital goods.
Next, direct foreign investment and the establishment of
industrial plants will lead to the development of a skilled
workforce, together with marketing and distributorship net-
works. At this second stage, foreign technology can be
adapted and applied by indigenous nationals. The import of
capital goods and the transfer of technology through licensing
agreements also becomes appropriate. The third stage of de-
velopment is characterized by the establishment of a significant
capacity for imitative research, with the developing country be-
coming an exporter of technology in its own right. At the third
stage, technology can be transferred through joint venture ar-
rangements, including joint research agreements.
Although Hansen's analysis is useful in understanding the
theory of development, her theory is subject to certain practi-
cal constraints. The multinational corporations most likely to
be the source of technology for developing countries will not
necessarily be offering a technology that has been specifically
developed for developing countries. For example, much of the
agricultural research in the industrialized countries is con-
cerned with improving mechanization to avoid labor expendi-
tures. This research is obviously going to be of little relevance
to small-scale cultivators in labor-abundant circumstances.
Griffin asserts that over half the research conducted in the rich
capitalist countries is of no immediate relevance to the devel-
opment of poor countries. 6' He suggests that research on de-
fense, space, and atomic energy are harmful to developing
countries, and that research on synthetic substitutes to natural
products such as jute, cotton, silk, and rubber are prejudicial
to the interests of some poor countries.
The small size of technology markets in developing coun-
tries, and hence the limited profit-making opportunities they
61. Griffin, The International Transmission of Inequality, WORLD DEV., Mar. 1974, at
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offer, will usually mean that technology exporters will not
adapt their wares to the particular circumstances of developing
countries. Rather, corporations will either offer the same tech-
nology that they sell in developed countries or possibly tech-
nology that they can no longer sell in those countries because
it has become outmoded.62
One of the most important economic limitations of the
suitability of technology for importation by a developing coun-
try is the capital expenditure required to utilize such technol-
ogy. Technology developed in an industrialized nation is
designed based upon a presumption of the availability of both
a fairly sophisticated infrastructure and the ready availability of
investment reserves.6" These facilities are simply not available
in developing countries. For example, the higher education
levels of industrialized countries produce higher managerial
and labor skills. Technologies based on the assumption of
those skills will require their emulation before that technology
can be effectively integrated.
The attempt by developing countries to leap stages of de-
velopment by the importation of technology may lead to the
omission of essential stages in industrial evolution. The skill
of a labor force develops at more or less the same pace as the
technology developed for that labor force. To transplant tech-
nology significantly in advance of the technological skills of the
recipient economy will mean both that the technology is in-
expertly utilized, and that the relevant expertise is not given an
opportunity to develop. 6'
The high wage rates of industrialized countries are a re-
flection of high labor productivity. They also act as an incen-
tive for innovators to introduce technology that minimizes the
input of this expensive labor. To an extent, this is reflected in
the utilization of large-scale mechanized units in industrial
production. The markets in developing countries are often
not sufficiently extensive to support this scale of production.
At the social welfare level, the appropriateness of technol-
62. See W. CHUDSON, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES ch. 1 (1971).
63. See Hawrylshyn, Capital Intensity Biases in Developing Country Technology Choices,
5J. DEV. ECON. 215 (1978).
64. See Todd & Simpson, The Appropriate-Technology Question in a Regional Context,
18 GROWTH & CHANGE 46 (1983).
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ogy is assessed in terms of its impact upon socioeconomic
structures. The impact of mechanization upon employment in
a labor-intensive economy is an obvious issue in determining
the appropriateness of technology. Transplanting the type of
mechanized, vehicular transport available in an industrialized
economy to a rural economy, in which animal power is the
principal source of locomotion, can also prove to be inappro-
priate.
Consumer goods from developed countries may satisfy
entirely different needs from those felt by consumers in devel-
oping countries. For example, intensively advertised, brand-
name garments offer consumers in industrialized countries at-
tributes of prestige and modishness that may be entirely inap-
propriate in a rural community where the evanescence of fash-
ion is subordinate to considerations of garment quality and
longevity. On the other hand, advertising and brand promo-
tion of consumer goods, even in the least developed countries,
may create the same sort of consumer demand as that in devel-
oped countries, along with the additional appeal of a vicarious
association with the life-style of developed countries. In these
circumstances' developing countries must judge whether to al-
locate any resources to obtaining such goods.65
The psychological factors relevant in the acquisition by
persons in developing countries of consumer items associated
with the more opulent circumstances of developed countries
have been identified as influencing the acquisition of inappro-
priate technology by developing countries. The most common
examples are the acquisition of national airlines, nuclear weap-
ons, and a space program.6 6 Other social welfare aspects of
technology transfer include the environmental, health, and
safety impacts of transfer.
Because economic growth has been identified as the pri-
mary objective of technology transfer, the non-economic im-
65. For further research, see the authorities referred to inJ. REIFFERS, TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ENDOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT 283-90 (1982).
66. At a more mundane level, Streeten mentions the example of a United States
manufacturer of toilet paper perforating machinery who was unable to dispose of
obsolete saw-tooth perforating equipment in three developing countries when these
perforations became unfashionable in the United States for the reason that the super-
seded perforations would be inconsistent with the dignity of consumers in those
countries. P. STREETEN, THE FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 387 n.1 (1972).
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pact of technology tends not to be considered significant. The
Bhopal disaster of December 3, 1984, may be cited as a conse-
quence of this attitude. That disaster was caused by the failure
of safety devices in a pesticide plant that permitted the escape
of lethal gases, killing some 2500 people and probably causing
long-term damage to the health of thousands of other people
who were exposed. It has been suggested that, in part, the
Bhopal disaster was precipitated by a failure to install expen-
sive safety devices that would have made the pesticide plant a
less attractive investment for the United States owner.67 In-
deed, it has been suggested that some multinational corpora-
tions establish dangerous factories in developing countries to
escape stringent domestic health and environmental law.68
The Chernobyl disaster is a vivid illustration of the ultimately
global effects of pollution, such that the environmental impact
of technology transfer has implications for both the exporting
and recipient nations. The developing country, by eschewing
health and safety concerns in pursuit of short-term economic
gains, may mean that in the long term it will be unable to se-
cure the quality of life promised by economic development.
A final non-economic factor that may have an important
bearing on the appropriateness of technology is the political
economy within which it is received. According to Galtung's
structure theory, every technology is associated with a particu-
lar social, economic, and cognitive structure.69 The structure
associated with a technology "produces, filters out and accepts
only the techniques that will be accompanied by such struc-
tures, thereby reinforcing the structures themselves." 70 Where
a proposed technology poses a threat to existing power
groups, whether political, scientific, or governmental, that
technology will invariably fail to obtain the support necessary
for its success. For example, an antiquated land tenure system
67. See Ashford & Nyers, Policy Issues for Consideration in Transferring Technology to
Developing Countries, 12 ECOLOGY L.J. 4 (1985).
68. See Castleman, The Export of Hazardous Factories to Developing Countries, 9 INT'L
J. HEALTH SERVICES 569 (1979).
69. I am indebted for this analysis to Stewart, Macro Policies for Appropriate Tech-
nology: An Introductory Classification, in TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNMENT
POLICIES 27 (J. James & S. Watanabe eds. 1985).
70. Galtung, The North/South Debate: Technology, Basic Human Needs and the New
International Economic Order, World Order Models Project, Working Paper No. 12, at
133 (1980).
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may prevent the adoption of modern agricultural techniques,
such as selective breeding, crop specialization, and irrigation.
Multiple decision-making organs and a complex bureacracy
thus may inhibit entrepreneurship.
A history of domination by an industrialized colonial
power may produce a residual cultural domination such that
scientists and engineers historically look to the colonial parent
for their technological education. The result is the inculcation
of skills and values inappropriate to the former colony's cir-
cumstances. 7 1 This type of influence is responsible in part for
the emigration of scientists and engineers from developing
countries. Significantly, the magnitude of this "brain drain" is
considered to outweigh the flow of technical assistance to de-
veloping countries.72
F. Technology Markets
Legislative strategies for controlling technology transfers
are invariably conceived of as interventions in the markets in
which technology is traded. However, to speak of a "market"
for technology is misleading. Unlike other economic goods,
technology is not produced directly for supply. Frequently it is
only available as part of a composite transaction involving
goods or plant and machinery. Some technology is available
for sale, but increasingly technology can be disseminated only
through direct investment.
Technology is manifested in diverse forms, ranging from
fairly simple agricultural implements to very complex com-
puter systems. A distinction may be drawn between "conven-
tional technology" and "high technology. '7' The former in-
cludes, for example, the technology in the shoe, textile, paper,
and cement industries. High technology industries are charac-
terized by very large "research and development expenditure,
a large element of complex patented or non-patented proprie-
tary technology, rapid and continuing technological change,
71. See, e.g., K.P. WONG, THE CULTURAL IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS IN SINGAPORE (1979); Godfrey & Langdon, Partners in Underdevelopment? The
Transnationalization Thesis in a Kenya Context, in TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND NA-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT 84-111 (J. Villamil ed. 1979).
72. See UNCTAD, The Reverse Transfer of Technology: A Survey of Its Main
Features Causes and Policy Implications, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/47 (1979).
73. W. CHUDSON, supra note 62, at 16-18.
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high capital requirements, a stake in maximizing the profits or
quasi-rents on this high technology and product differentia-
tion."74 Markets for conventional technology tend to be a
good deal more competitive than those for high technology.
Consequently, strategies for controlling technology transfer
are likely to be more effective in the conventional technology
markets, where they are less needed.75
The overwhelming proportion of high technology crea-
tion is concentrated within a few multinational firms and in
only a few sectors of industry. Thus, a 1970 OECD survey in-
dicated that in the United States the eight largest firms ac-
counted for over one third of total expenditures on research
and development, and the forty largest firms accounted for
70%.76 This survey indicated that over three quarters of re-
search and development expenditure was absorbed by the air-
craft, electronic, and chemical industries. Additionally, the fact
that the targets of regulation often control assets that easily
outstrip the national product of the developing country often
inhibits strategizing by the regulator to control the terms on
which technology is transferred by these corporations.
In the concentrated markets for high technology, transfers
tend to be direct, through the establishment of subsidiaries,
and to a lesser extent through joint ventures. On the other
hand, in the more competitive markets for conventional tech-
nology, transfers more frequently involve licensing, turn-key
77projects, and management contracts.
The efficacy with which the transfer of technology can be
regulated is often a reflection of the bargaining power of the
respective parties. The small share in the international trade
in technology enjoyed by developing countries is in part a re-
flection of the inappropriateness of much Western technology,
and in part a consequence of the perception by the vendors of
technology that those countries represent inadequate returns
and unacceptable investment risks.78 In these circumstances,
74. Id. at 19.
75. Id.
76. See OECD, GAPS IN TECHNOLOGY: ANALYTICAL REPORT (1970).
77. See Greer, Control of Terms and Conditions for International Transfers of Technology
to Developing Countries, in COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 42, 52 (0.
Schachter & R. Hellawell eds. 1981).
78. See the authorities referred to in Henry, Political Risks in Patent Licensing, in 4
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the capacity of developing countries to regulate the terms of
technology trade is considerably circumscribed.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY
A. Overview
Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to ex-
amination of the prevalent restrictions on Third World tech-
nology transfer. 79 These restrictions represent, in varying de-
grees, limitations on the access of developing countries to
technology. These limitations typically entail: (a) tied
purchases of additional goods or services; (b) restrictions on
exports; (c) the imposition of onerous guarantees;
(d) restrictions on competition in the domestic market; and
(e) constraints limiting the dynamic effects of the transfer.80 A
1970 questionnaire addressed by UNCTAD to all technology-
receiving developing countries indicated that nearly all reply-
ing countries were subject to one or more of these limitations
in their technology transactions. 81 Similar results have been
found in surveys of licensing agreements in Australia, 82 Can-
ada,83 and the United Kingdom.84
B. Typical Restrictions
1. Tie-Ins
The most common vendor-imposed restriction identified
in the 1970 UNCTAD survey was the conditioning of supply of
THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING 520.391, 520.401-.405 (M. Finnegan & R.
Goldscheider eds. 1980).
79. For a recent survey of this literature, see G. CABANELLAS, supra note 41.
80. For a comprehensive list of the types of restrictive provisions contained in
technology transfers to developing countries, see UNCTAD, Control of Restrictive
Practices in Transfer of Technology Transactions, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/72
(1982); UNCTAD, Major Issues Arising from the Transfer of Technology to Devel-
oping Countries, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/AC.I 1/10/Rev.2, 38 (1975).
81. See UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/AC.1 1/10/Rev. 2, supra note 80.
82. See studies referred to in T. MANDEVILLE, D. LAMBERTON & E. BISHOP, Eco-
NOMIC EFFECTS OF THE AUSTRALIAN PATENTS SYSTEM 164-71 (1982).
83. Firestone reported that "in 85 percent of cases export limitations were at-
tached to patents licensed in Canada." O.J. FIRESTONE, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
PATENTS 153 (1971); see also S. OSTRY, WORKING PAPER ON PATENT LAW REVISION 80
(1976).
84. See C. TAYLOR & A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYS-
TEM 372-73 (1973).
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technology on the purchase of intermediate products, capital
equipment, spare parts, and even designated personnel.85 An
inevitable effect of these tie-ins is to prevent the technology
acquirer from obtaining these ancillary goods and services
from the most competitive sources of supply. As a conse-
quence, even where an item of technology is offered to pur-
chasers in developing countries at what appears to be a
favorable price, the invariable overpricing of the tied products
represents a hidden cost of the transfer.
Not only do tie-ins affect production costs through the
overpricing of inputs, but they also may have indirect adverse
effects on development. For example, economic growth in the
developing country will be inhibited to the extent that the op-
portunity to produce the ancillary products and services will be
denied to the technology acquirer. Invariably the products
that are tied in will have to be imported from the foreign tech-
nology supplier or its related enterprises, with further deleteri-
ous foreign exchange implications.8 6
2. Export Restrictions
Replies to the 1970 UNCTAD questionnaire indicated
that technology acquirers in developing countries were com-
monly subject to both direct and indirect controls on exports.
For example, 99%, 97%, and 93% of agreements, in Peru,
Mexico, and Chile, respectively, contained export restric-
tions.8 7 These restrictions took a variety of forms, ranging
from express total prohibitions on exports, through permissi-
ble exports of designated products to designated markets, and
to market share arrangements implied between parent and
subsidiary enterprises. Of these provisions, total prohibitions
and the necessity for prior approval were most common.88
The obvious impact of this category of restrictions is to
hamper the growth of industries within developing countries,
depriving them of the benefits of the generalized system of
preferences and of regional integration and cooperation.
85. UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/AC.I 1/10/Rev.2, supra note 80, 38.
86. For the effects of tying on developing countries see id. 44-52.
87. Id. 58.
88. Id.
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3. Requirement of Guarantees
To minimize some of the investment risks in developing
countries, technology suppliers have insisted on guarantees
concerning royalties, tax rates, tariffs, and exchange rates.
Variations in the amounts of the above that are adverse to the
technology supplier are offset by compensatory payments to
technology suppliers to reimburse them for any losses they
may suffer as a result of state controls over royalty rates and
the like. The obvious effect of such guarantees is to frustrate
the policy objectives of any state-inspired variation of these
amounts.
4. Competition Restrictions
Certain technology license clauses restrict the ability of
the acquirer either to compete directly with the supplier or to
deal with the supplier's competitors. Additionally, technology
suppliers have obtained tariff protection against the import of
competitive goods as well as monopoly rights over sources of
raw materials. 89 Often these advantages are supplemented by
securing local patent protection to prevent the entry of com-
petitive products.90 The effect of these provisions is not only
to constrict the markets open to developing countries, but also
to limit the range and sources of technology available to the
acquirer.
Clauses in acquisition agreements obliging the receiver of
technology to manufacture its products in strict compliance
with the specifications of foreign technology suppliers are a
particular. problem for developing countries. This obligation
prevents the necessary adaptation of imported technology to
accord with local circumstances and to be appropriate for do-
mestic consumption.
C. Impact of Limitations to Technology Access
The comprehensive cataloguing by UNCTAD 9' and
others92 of restrictive provisions that have appeared in indus-
89. Id. 80.
90. See Vaitsos, Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries, 9 J. DEV.
STUDS. 71, 77-79 (1972).
91. UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/72, supra note 80.
92. See Greer, The Case Against Patent Systems in Less-Developed Countries, 8J. INT'L L.
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trial property licensing agreements has presupposed the inher-
ent inequity of such provisions. Indeed, their characterization
as inhibiting access to technology93 has emphasized this sup-
posed propensity. On the other hand, it has been suggested
that these restrictions enhance the tailoring of the subject mat-
ter of technology transfer agreements to ensure that acquirers
pay for no more than they actually require. For example,
McFetridge and Smith assert that:
Market restrictions and unilateral grantbacks allow the li-
censee a contractual method of renouncing markets for and
uses of a technology for which he does not wish to pay. If
such a renunciation is prohibited licensors will have to allow
for the possibility of the licensee's use of the technology for
purposes and markets for which he has no interest. As a
consequence the cost of the licensing arrangement is in-
creased.94
Similarly, tie-ins are explained as a useful low-cost mea-
sure of the intensity of use of a technology. Where the alterna-
tive is to charge an average price for the technology, the small
user will be disadvantaged by the higher price it will be obliged
to pay.95
According to UNCTAD, the widespread condemnations
by developing countries of the restrictions contained in indus-
trial property licences may indicate either that the cost savings
argument has not been accepted, or that those savings can be
realized by means other than the imposition of restrictive con-
ditions.96 What is particularly important is that the duration
and ambit of such restraints do not exceed that which is rea-
sonable for the exploitation of the industrial property right at
issue.
& ECON. 223 (1973); Vaitsos, The Revision of the International Patent System: Legal Consid-
erations for a Third World Position, 4 WORLD DEV. 85 (1976); Timberg, Restrictive Business
Practices in the International Transfer and Difusion of Technology, in COMPETITION IN INTER-
NATIONAL BusINESS, supra note 77, at 84.
93. E.g., UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/AC.I 1/10/Rev.2, supra note 80, ch. II.
94. D. MCFETRIDGE & D. SMITH, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
73 (1979) (Report to Canadian Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs).
95. Id. at 75.
96. UNCTAD, The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to
Developing Countries, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/AC. 1/19/Rev. 1, at 23-29. (1975).
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V. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
The theoretical and practical deficiencies of technology
transfer as a means of development do not gainsay its function
as a catalyst for economic development. However, in light of
the problems mentioned above, technology transfer is no
longer treated as a panacea for development. Current scholar-
ship is directed toward resolution of these problems and ways
in which to render the transfer of technology more effective in
its developmental role.97
A. Restructuring the Legal Environment
As has been emphasized above, the international legal en-
vironment encompassing transfers of technology evolved in re-
sponse to the particular requirements of the industrialized
countries that dominate the technology market. As a conse-
quence, demands by developing countries for the restructuring
of the legal environment assume a central role in the NIEO.
However, given the insignificant commercial position of the
developing countries in technology markets, the types of regu-
latory stratagems to which developing countries can resort are
of the soft, non-prohibitory variety. Principal among these is
the encouragement of voluntary codes of conduct, such as that
promoted in the UNCTAD Code of Conduct on the Transfer
of Technology and a similar code of conduct for multinational
corporations .98
Another touchstone of the practicability of reconstructing
the legal environment is the ongoing process of revision of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. 99
97. See, e.g., A. BHALLA, D. JAMES & Y. STEVENS, BLENDING OF NEW AND TRADI-
TIONAL TECHNOLOGIES (1986); INTEGRATION OF EMERGING AND TRADITIONAL TECH-
NOLOGIES (E. von Weizacker, N. Swaminathan & A. Lemma eds. 1983); TECHNOLOGI-
CAL CHOICE AND CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CON-
STRAINTS (B. Lucas & S. Friedman eds. 1983).
98. See Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Con-
trol of Restrictive Business Practices Having Adverse Effects on International Trade,
UNCTAD Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/I (July 1978); see also Greenhill, UNCTAD Control of
Restrictive Business Practices, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 67 (1978); Joelson, The Proposed
International Code of Conduct as Related to Restrictive Business Practices, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 837 (1976).
99. For a discussion, see Anderegg, The Proposed Revision of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property---The Position of the Developed Countries, in A.B.A., CUR-
RENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF LICENSING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 134-
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The ownership by foreign nationals of the vast majority of the
industrial property rights registered in developing coun-
tries,' 00 pursuant to the Paris Convention, means that the lat-
ter are devoting scarce resources to administer a system which
is perceived to have overtones of foreign domination. As a
trade-off, the developing countries are seeking some limita-
tions to the scope of application of the Paris Convention.' 0 '
The difficulties attending the negotiation of a code that is
binding merely in honor, 0 2 as well as the revision of the Paris
Convention, 0 3 illustrate the magnitude of legal reconstruction
in this area. These experiences suggest that the diametrical in-
terests of the developed and developing countries can be rec-
onciled only through fairly bland expressions of intention.
B. Enriching Market Information
As in markets for more conventional goods, the informa-
tion available to technology consumers plays a very important
role. The vendors of technology, like any other product, are
interested in supplying their most profitable items. The selec-
tive offerings of these vendors have often been the sole source
of the information to developing countries on the technology
that is available. Thus it has become imperative for developing
countries to be capable of forming their own evaluations of the
appropriateness of the technologies being offered. Some of
the strategies of the NIEO are directed to this end. As early as
1973, the United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-
tion ("UNIDO") issued guidelines to assist developing coun-
tries in negotiating technology licenses.'0 4 A more compre-
hensive set of guidelines was issued in 1977 by the World In-
65 (1980); Kirk, Revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property-
Major Issues of Interest to Developing Countries, in A.B.A., CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ASPECTS OF LICENSING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1-19 (1980).
100. It has been estimated that developing countries own only about 1% of the
world stock of patents, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/AC.I 1/19/Rev.l, supra note 96, 263,
and about 2.2% of all foreign trademarks, UNCTAD, The Role of Trade Marks in
Developing Countries, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/3/Rev.I, 104 (1979).
101. See Kunz-Hallenstein, supra note 38, at 649.
102. See W. FIKENTSCHER, supra note 32.
103. See Kunz-Hallenstein, supra note 38.
104. U.N. INDUS. DEV. ORG., GUIDELINES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN
TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TECHNOLOGY
LICENSE AGREEMENTS, U.N. Doc. ID/98, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.B.l (1973).
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tellectual Property Organization. °5  In 1976, UNCTAD
established its Advisory Service on the Transfer of Technol-
ogy. 10 6 The purpose of this Service is to provide assistance in
the formulation and implementation of technology planning in
developing countries, including the establishment and modifi-
cation of institutional infrastructures to implement technology
programs. 0 7 UNIDO also makes available consultants to assist
nations in evaluating available technology packages.'0 8
One limitation of the information services available is that
they are helpful in evaluating technology packages that have
been offered to target consumers, but they do not indicate the
range of comparable packages available. Various suggestions
have been made for the establishment of technology informa-
tion collecting centers to provide information not only as to
the availability, cost and technical specifications of plant, but
also regarding the scale, labor requirements, product nature,
input nature, and likely repair cost of available plant. 10 9 Re-
gional centers for cooperation in the development and transfer
of technology are in the course of being established in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America. 110
C. Development of Appropriate Technologies
Because the vast majority of expenditure on research and
development ("R&D") is devoted to the particular problems of
the developed countries,"' it is necessary, in the short run, to
focus on establishing techniques for the modification of tech-
105. WIPO PUB. No. 620(E), LICENSING GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1977).
106. See Planning the Technological Transformation of Developing Countries,
UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/59.4 (1980); Technology Planning in Developing Coun-
tries, UNCTAD Doc. TD/238/Supp.1 (1979).
107. Planning the Technological Transformation of Developing Countries,
UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/59.4 (1980); Technology Planning in Developing Coun-
tries, UNCTAD Doc. TD/238/Supp.l (1979).
108. Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer: Current Activities of International
Organizations Within the. United Nations System, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/269, at 22
(1985).
109. Stewart, Technology and Employment in LDCs, WORLD DEV., Mar. 1974, at 17,
36.
110. UNCTAD, Promotion and Encouragement of Technological Innovation, A
Selective Review of Policies and Instruments, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/139, 56-
62 (1986).
111. Helleiner refers to an estimate of only two percent of research being ad-
dressed to the problems of developing countries. Helleiner, supra note 45, at 307.
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nology for the purposes of developing countries. An obvious
example is the greater use of manual labor, such as in con-
struction and transportation projects.
For the future it is obviously necessary to increase the
amount of R&D relevant to developing countries. This will oc-
cur in the industrialized countries without compulsion as the
developing countries assume a greater significance as purchas-
ers of technology. To hasten the process, developing coun-
tries should use regional cooperation agreements to aggregate
their market power in collective purchasing arrangements and
joint marketing ventures. On an individual level, developing
countries can offer tax, tariff, and exchange rate incentives to
those multinational corporations prepared to offer appropriate
technologies.
Ideally, the developing countries should themselves un-
dertake the task of modifying available technologies into ap-
propriate forms. Some successes have been achieved in the
field of agricultural research by jointly operated agricultural
research institutes.' 12 Joint agricultural research has been sup-
plemented by the establishment of cooperative schemes for the
marketing of primary products." 13
One of the factors leading to the acquisition of inappropri-
ate technology is the importance of commercial considerations
in research and development decisions. Many of the short-
comings of this form of technology generation can be over-
come by non-commercial aid programs operated by govern-
ments or international organizations.1 14 To date, the promise
of this form of assistance has not been realized, largely because
of the shortage of the very special know-how involved in adap-
tive technology." 5
112. See Evenson, Technology Generation in Agriculture, in AGRICULTURE IN DEVEL-
OPMENT THEORY 192-223 (L. Reynolds ed. 1975).
113. For a comprehensive list see Adebanjo, Economic Co-operation Among Develop-
ing Countries: A Component of International Development Strategy, in UNCTAD AND THE
SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE 175, 198-99 (M. Cutajar ed. 1985).
114. See INNOVATION POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (G. Sweeney ed.
1985); R. ROTHWELL & W. ZEGVELD, INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1981).
115. See OECD, REPORT ON THE WORKSHOP ON THE EVALUATION OF THE EFFEC-
TIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT MEASURES FOR THE STIMULATION OF INNOVATION (1984).
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D. Development of Indigenous Technological Capacity
The object of developing countries in technology transfers
is to enhance their technological capacity. As this capacity is
enhanced, each generation of indigenous technology will
render subsequent transfers less significant. The initiatives of
international agencies such as UNCTAD, UNIDO, and WIPO
simultaneously relate transfer strategies to the transformation
of developing countries.
1. National Technology Policies
Individual developing countries have been encouraged to
formulate national technology policies as an integral part of
their national development program. Such policies are recom-
mended to include "the determination of technological priori-
ties, mobilization of natural resources, dissemination of the ex-
isting national stock of technology, identification of the sectors
in which imported technology would be required and determi-
nation of R&D priorities for the development and improve-
ment of endogenous technologies."' " 6 Central to the institu-
tion of national technology planning is the establishment of
national technology planning centers to direct and coordinate
the deployment of technology toward those sectors of the
economy where it is required."
7
UNCTAD recommends, as an integral part of technology
planning, the allocation of a specific portion of the national
budget for research and development. It proposes target
amounts of 2% of Gross National Product to be spent on re-
search and development by 1990 and 3% by 2000.18
a. Tax Incentives for Technological Development
One of the oldest incentives for the promotion of R&D in
developed market economy countries is the provision of taxa-
tion relief. Such incentives have invariably been based on the
deduction of R&D operating expenditure from taxable income,
and the offer of depreciation allowances on capital expendi-
ture. In some countries, tax credits are employed either as an
116. UNCTAD, Formulation of a Strategy for the Technological Transforma-
tion of Developing Countries, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/779, 7 (1980).
117. Id. 10.
118. Id.
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incentive to stimulate investment in a specified technology sec-
tor or as a general incentive for incremental expenditure on
R&D."I 9 For example, the Australian Government recently in-
troduced a 150% tax concession for the first six years of a com-
pany's expenditure on a R&D project. 12 0 Likewise, tax credits
of between 25% and 50% for incremental R&D expenditures
are available in the United States, Canada, and Japan.' 2 1
The efficacy of tax relief as an incentive for R&D in market
economy countries has not been sufficiently explored. How-
ever, an obvious advantage of a tax incentive policy is that it
extends the opportunity for innovation to less successful firms
by easing their cash flow problems, and thus enabling them to
carry forward their operating losses. 22
Although the smaller fiscal resources of developing coun-
tries constrain the extent of tax incentives that can be offered
to encourage technological innovation, tax incentive policies
have been adopted by a number of partially industrialized de-
veloping countries.12 3 In the Republic of Korea, firms with
R&D expenditures are offered a choice between a 10% tax
credit or a 50% accelerated depreciation allowance. 124 In Sin-
gapore, an investment allowance of up to 50% is granted to
firms planning to incur expenditures for R&D. 125 In Malaysia
an allowance of 33 1/3% is offered to firms which incur capital
expenditures on general R&D.' 2 6 This allowance is increased
to 50% for expenditures devoted to improving technologies in
agricultural based industries. In Mexico a 20% tax credit is
granted for capital expenditures on R&D. 127 Finally, in Peru,
up to 10% of the net income of a firm planning to incur R&D
expenditures can be deducted from income tax where these
expenditures exceed 2% of net income and the research pro-
ject is carried out in collaboration with a national university.128
119. See UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/139, supra note 110, 7.
120. Id. 7.
121. Id.
122. Id. 8.
123. Id. 26.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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b. Direct Financial Assistance
A number of developed countries offer a variety of forms
of direct financial incentives to firms to encourage research
and development. 29 These include grants, loan assistance and
risk-sharing investment. Direct financial assistance can be of-
fered as a means of supporting the R&D activities of smaller
enterprises or in stimulating particular industrial sectors. In
particular, direct financial assistance is used in France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, and the United States to encourage
R&D in high technology industries such as microelectronics,
information technology, biotechnology, robotics, and nuclear
technology. 30
In developing countries, financial assistance schemes are
more widely used than tax incentives to encourage R&D.'
Direct loans for approved R&D projects are provided in the
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Colombia. For example, in
1981 the government of Singapore introduced a Research and
Development Assistance Scheme to assist R&D projects of
"national importance and technological significance."'132 Simi-
larly, in 1980, the Republic of Korea established the Special
Research and Development Projects Scheme to provide finan-
cial support to enterprises for the development of technologies
in high risk industries, or where large capital investment is re-
quired. 33
Argentina, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea have intro-
duced a number of risk-sharing schemes. 34 In Mexico, the
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia ("CONACYT") ad-
ministers a risk-sharing scheme under which it assumes up to
75% of the cost of a technological development project. Re-
imbursement of the funds granted under the scheme is re-
quired only if the project is successful. The Korea Technology
Development Corporation participates in the equity of new,
technology-intensive firms and provides conditional loans, re-
munerating itself through sales if the firm's products are suc-
cessfully introduced into the market. At a lower level of risk-
129. Id. 4 10-20.
130. Id. 4 13-16.
131. Id. 4 27-31.
132. Id. 27.
133. Id. 27.
134. Id. 44 28-30.
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sharing involvement, the Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia In-
dustrial ("INTI") of Argentina provides the use of its labora-
tory facilities and the assistance of its technical staff for techno-
logical projects. The obligation of firms to pay for these serv-
ices is conditional upon the success of the relevant project.
Among the other financial incentives developing countries
offer to encourage the development of indigenous technology
are the provision of loans on favorable terms for technology
projects, usually, through state-owned financial institutions es-
tablished for this purpose. For example, in Brazil the
Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos ("FINEP") provides fund-
ing for technological projects.13 5 Additionally, some countries
provide financial incentives to encourage collaborative re-
search through universities. Thus, for example, the Apoio a
Empresa Nacional ("ADTEN") program of FINEP grants fi-
nancial credits at low rates of interest to firms that conduct
their research through universities or research institutes. 136
CONACYT in Mexico provides funding on a similar basis.137
The facility with which the governments of developing
countries can provide financial incentives for indigenous tech-
nological development depends upon the funds available to
them. Beside the funds that can be obtained through foreign
aid and through the United Nations Financing System for Sci-
ence and Technology, 38 a possible indigenous source of finan-
cial incentive is government procurement policy. A recent
study of a number of key industries in the United States
stresses the importance of government procurement in influ-
encing innovation and industrial change.13 9 It pointed out that
the relevant government agencies deliberately tried to in-
duce the development of products that were suited for their
purposes. The vehicles employed included procurement
contracts written so as to cover the R&D cost of the particu-
lar design (a disguised form of R&D support), direct R&D
135. UNCTAD, Policies Laws and Regulations on the Transfer, Application and
Development of Technology, Periodic Report 1986, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/133,
42 (1986).
136. Id. 44.
137. Id. 47.
138. G.A. Res. 218, 34 U.N. GAOR (Supp. No. 46) at 153, 155-57, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979).
. 139. See GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
(R. Nelson ed. 1982).
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support associated with a procurement contract, and sup-
port of basic and generic research. 40
The example provided by those developed countries that
employ public procurement policies to marshal their limited
resources to induce industry to focus its technological initia-
tives in specified areas' 4 ' has an obvious relevance for develop-
ing countries.
c. National Research Institutes
Indirect financial assistance can be provided for firms in
developing countries through the establishment of national re-
search institutes that undertake the sort of infrastructure re-
search that might not be attractive to private commercial enter-
prises. Examples of these institutes are the Centre for Techno-
logical Innovation ("CIT") in Mexico and the Institute for
Industrial Technology Research ("ITINTEC") in Peru. Both
the CIT and ITINTEC provide personnel training, technologi-
cal advice, and production support services for industrial en-
terprises.'4 2 The latter include product testing and quality
control, as well as product modification.' 4 3
The record of national research institutes in developing
countries has been unsatisfactory, partly because of the inade-
quacy of resources and largely because of poor linkages with
industry.'4 4 The poor linkages have been attributed to (a) the
inadequate digsemination of information about the activities of
institutes; (b) the lack of agencies for the commercialization of
the R&D activities of the institutes; and (c) the failure of these
institutes to meet the technological needs of the private sec-
tor. 14' The most difficult of these problems will be identifying
the particular R&D needs of indigenous industries.' 46
140. Id. at 460.
141. See also R. ROTHWELL & W. ZEGVELD, supra note 114.
142. UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/139, supra note 110, 31.
143. Id.
144. See UNDP/UNIDO, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES, Evalu-
ation Report No. 6 (1982).
145. UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.6/139, supra note 110, 56-60.
146. See Dahlman & Westphal, Technological Effort in Industrial Development and In-
terpretive Survey of Recent Research, in THE ECONOMICS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IN DEVEL-
OPING COUrRIES 105-37 (F. Stewart &J. James eds. 1982).
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2. Collective Self-Reliance
Parallel to the achievement of indigenous technological
autonomy has been the progress towards greater technological
self-sufficiency among developing nations, as part of the cur-
rent direction of the NIEO towards collective self-reliance for
developing countries. Collective self-reliance as a policy for
developing countries was articulated for the first time at a con-
ference organized in 1976 by The Group of 77 at Mexico City,
and again at Arusha, in 1979.117 A comprehensive Programme
of Action was adopted by the High-Level Conference on Eco-
nomic Co-operation among Developing Countries at Caracas
in May 1981. The Caracas Programme addressed the seven
interrelated areas of trade, technology, food, agriculture, en-
ergy, raw materials, finance, and industrialization. 14 8 It sought
to rationalize technological research efforts among developing
countries. To this end it launched the Development Commu-
nication Network ("DEVNET") as a clearinghouse for informa-
tion on development projects conducted in developing coun-
tries.
As part of the policy of commercial self-reliance, a number
of regional centers on technology have been established.
Among the functions that these centers will perform are:
(i) the joint acquisition of technology; (ii) cooperative arrange-
ments for consulting, design and engineering services;
(iii) joint research and development; (iv) establishment of in-
formation systems on all matters pertaining to the acquisition,
adaptation, development, and utilization of technology; and
(v) the establishment of intergovernmental centers in eco-
nomic sectors of critical importance.'4 Infrastructure projects
are particularly suited to joint development by these centers
because such undertakings might not be of interest to commer-
cial transferors of technology. Examples include the manufac-
ture of machine tools, boat building, and the processing of raw
materials.
The emerging notion of technological integration, in
147. Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negoti-
ations, adopted Feb. 15, 1979, reprinted in UNCTAD Doc. TD/CODE TOT/CRP.I
(1979).
148. See Guerro, Collective Self-Reliance. Turning a Concept into a Reality, in
UNCTAD AND THE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE, supra note 113, at 235, 235-42.
149. UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/779, supra note 116, 11.
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which the technological needs of developing countries are sat-
isfied on a regional basis, has evolved logically from the con-
cept of self-reliance through joint technological cooperation.
In this way, not only are the economies of scale from the ag-
gregation of market power realized, but opportunities for the
establishment of intra-regional specializations are also at-
tracted.
3. Decommercialization of Technology
UNCTAD has recommended that the large number of
technologies available in the public domain in developed coun-
tries should be made freely available to developing coun-
tries.' 50 Pursuant to this recommendation, UNCTAD pro-
poses the establishment of registers of available technology.
More controversially, UNCTAD has recommended the decom-
mercialization of technology "in those areas which cater to the
satisfaction of critical needs of developing countries-for ex-
ample, pharmaceuticals, food and food processing, housing
and building materials, public transport, telecommunications,
and energy supplies."'' 5 1
4. Control of Transnational Corporations
In addition to the codes of practice dealing with the trans-
fer of technology by transnational corporations, UNCTAD has
proposed the institution of controls over the technology activi-
ties of subsidiaries of transnational corporations located in de-
veloping countries. Essentially these controls require subsidi-
aries of transnational corporations to realign their research
and development activities to coincide with the technological
priorities of their host countries. 5 2 Among the detailed rec-
ommendations is the obligation for subsidiaries to "cooperate
with developing countries in their efforts to establish a 'critical
mass' of scientific, technological and managerial manpower
through the institution of in-plant training facilities, support to
national training institutions ... and the establishment and de-
velopment of consultancy services."'' 53 Subsidiaries are also
150. Id. 13.
151. Id.
152. Id. 15.
153. Id.
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obliged to replace any scientists or technologists from devel-
oped countries with those from the host country. An obvious
problem with this sort of proposal is that they become another
cost for the transnational corporation in dealing with a devel-
oping country. If that cost becomes too high, either those
dealings will cease, or some alternative to direct investment
will be selected as the commercial basis for technology trans-
fers.
5. Funding
The establishment of essential technological infrastruc-
ture burdens developing countries with expenses that are not
immediately recoverable. The various multilateral cooperative
ventures reduce these expenses to an extent. The United Na-
tions Financing System for Science and Technology' 54
promises to provide a source of funding for strengthening the
scientific and technological capacities of developing countries.
CONCLUSION
At the end of the Second World War, anthropologists in
New Guinea became concerned that a number of the native
tribes were abandoning their traditional hunting and gathering
activities to camp around large strips of land that the tribes had
cleared, apparently for religious purposes, in the tropical jun-
gle. It transpired that these tribes observed an unloading of
United States Army cargo planes supplying the U.S. military
forces in the area. Having experienced what was to them a su-
pernatural arrival, the tribes then endeavored to encourage the
return of these god-like planes by the construction of air strips.
As we have seen, there is much in the technology development
debate that shares something of the cargo-cult mentality of the
New Guinea tribes. It will be important to avoid the problems
that this mentality can easily engender in developing countries
in their efforts to procure the most appropriate technologies
for their circumstances and their attempts to combine technol-
ogy procurement with the development of indigenous technol-
ogy.
154. G.A. Res. 218, 34 U.N. GAOR (Supp. No. 46) at 153, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979).
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